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Abstract
This paper will discuss the flight certification
of the next generation Reusable Launch
Vehicle (RLV). It will define certification as
currently understood, as it will be required in
the future, the difference between these two,
and what this difference means for the next
generation systems design.
Together, NASA and industry have been
tasked with demonstrating technologies
focused on a reusable single stage to orbit
(SSTO) vehicle which will dramatically reduce
the costs of achieving low earth orbit. This
vision of routine and affordable access to
space, if achieved, is driven toward bringing
the benefits of space to humanity through a
quantum leap in accessibility by means of
drastically reduced vehicle turnaround times
and recurring flight costs. The approach to
certification will be key to the success or
failure of this endeavor. Previous and current
space vehicle efforts are familiar with the term
“certification”. However, the express goals of
the RLV program, by necessity, will alter the
current definition and mindset toward
“certification”.
This paper will focus principally on the
certification process from two perspectives.
The first is the NASA Shuttle operation and
it’s approach to certification. This is chosen
for being the only current space vehicle with
partial reusability. It is, therefore, a starting
point. The second perspective is the virtual
target for operation of the next generation
RLV. This vehicle has yet to be defined
although many concepts, technologies and
approaches are being worked by NASA and
industry. It is precisely the approach to
certification that will shape the future of this
program and the eventual approach to the
design. This approach, in turn, will define the
resulting configuration.
In the process of defining certification for the
RLV previous efforts in this area will be
reviewed. The subjects of reliability, vehicle
health management or “smart systems”,
affordability and supportability will be
discussed in relation to the issue of
certification. Also, the relationship of
certification to launching off a range versus
flying off an operational site will be reviewed.
Other applicable subjects such as the methods
of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
will also be discussed. Current RLV concepts
and program material relevant to technology
pursuits and goals will also be reviewed with
relation to the subject of certification.
Certification - Definition
The use of the term “certification” as focused
on here is that process which assures a design
is capable of safely carrying out it’s intended
purpose. For a Reusable Launch Vehicle
certification the goal is to assure flight
worthiness of a system. It is also intended the
certification be for “continued”
flightworthiness since reusability is a principal
characteristic of the system.
It is not the intent hereto emphasize the term
certification in reference to processes that
3-37
assure the readiness for use of a particular
vehicle or launch system. Neither is the intent
here to associate the term with the processes
by which a particular vehicle is maintained
flightworthy. For this, the terms processing or
maintenance are more appropriately used as
separate from certification.
Current NASA Shuttle Certification Processes
- Two Types
In any discussion of Shuttle certification a
distinction must be made between that
certification which is a part of the research,
design and development process through
implementation versus that certification which
occurs continually such as from flight to flight.
l The first type of certification involves
development of systems to a degree that
subsequent assemblies can be
manufactured and operated without having
to undergo the same degree of test or
scrutiny. It is also referred to often as
“qualification” or “qual test”.
. The second type of certification involves
processes which assure a particular, actual
assembly (part, component, subassembly,
line replaceable unit or LRU, system or
whole vehicle and ground system) is ready
for operational use or flight. This last may
also be called “processing” (or
maintenance) leading to certification
though many sub-categories of processes
may be identified here for a system such as
the Space Shuttle.
A current example of the first type of
certification is the Space Shuttle Main Engine
(SSME) Alternate Turbopump Development
(ATD) program. Turbopumps area major
part of the turnaround work on the SSME’s.
The Shuttle main engines in particular,
propulsion in general, is one of the main
drivers of Shuttle recurring costs whether
strictly at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) or
through the associated infrastructure (people
and facilities) that exist elsewhere around the
country such as in these development efforts.
A related example of the second type of
certification is the tracking and application of
allowable life limits to processing a particular
serial number engine. This determines what
stays versus what is removed and replaced
during engine refurbishment for example.
These two uses of the term “certification” are
very interrelated. One* tie between the two is
the fleet leader program. Fleet leader
components are set aside for the express
purpose of being tested well beyond what
would be acceptable for flight. Their purpose
is to provide experience and knowledge into
allowable life limits for components. Low and
high cycle fatigue limits, analogous to starts
and seconds (all similar to aircraft
terminology), are determined by previous
histories which include fleet leader
components. For example, 18 when extensive
fleet hot-fire exposure data are available and
there are no failures or major material review
disposition (MRD) history, the life limit may
be 25 percent of fleet leader. Under some
criterion (requiring periodic inspection) this
may be 50 percent of the representative fleet
leader or the failed unit if one has occurred.
The above values of 25 and 50% are the result
of applying factors of safety of 4 and 2 to the
components. This would seem to indicate a
high degree of safety and margin in the
hardware. However, the ATD program was
begun precisely to address criticality issues
first, and second to eliminate removal and
replacement of the Rocketdyne Turbopumps
every flight. For many components safety
factors of 2 or 4 can and do equal only a few
uses given fleet leader experience that shows
short useful lives.
* Other methods used include analysis to determine life
limits and assure reliability.
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If a fleet leader builds an experience base that,
when factors of 2 are applied, results in
operating limits that are low, the certification
of systems built from those components has
that much greater difficulty in realizing any
goal of reusability with little or no
maintenance between uses. For example, a
Deviation Approval Request (DAR) for a
turnaround duct may establish a life limit of 5
starts where the original requirement was for
60. Only by continuing to accumulate time on
the fleet leaders (or development articles in
this case) and having no failures can the limit
be raised eventually toward the original goal.
Returning to the distinctions about the types
of certification, it becomes clear then that the
second type of certification, certification of
particular hardware, might more appropriately
be called “Verification of Flight Readiness” or
“worthiness”. As the useful life of systems
diminishes and the resource intensiveness of
turnarounds increases, the “verification” then
becomes equated with “certification.” This
previous type of certification is causally
related to the first type of certification (a truer
use of the term), certification of designs so
that subsequent assemblies need not receive
the same degree of scrutiny (resources) while
still assuring readiness for operation, safety
during use, and the capability to carry out the
intended purpose.
The ATD LOX turbopump, by virtue of it’s
certification process, will allow greater reuse
without any changes in safety factors. Having
accumulated run times on units equal to over
40 flights or 20,000 seconds, the pump is then
safely used up to 10 times (using the factor of
4) without any scheduled maintenance. This
assumes among* * other things no major
failures during this testing. This is not to say
the road to reusability is entirely clear.
** Such as the ability to control production processes so as to
have consistent, repeatable results (subsequent
manufactured units).
Alternate Turbopump Development -An
Example of Certification of the First Type
The establishment of longer life limits through
extensive testing is a focus of the Pratt &
Whitney ATD program. This basic philosophy
should allow the LOX turbopumps on the
SSME’s to be left on for 10 flights without a
need for removal as exists on the Rocketdyne
design. However, the new turbopumps, set to
fly on STS-70, have had their share of
problems. The first flight P&W High Pressure
Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP) was shipped
to KSC installed on an engine but nonetheless
had to be removed and replaced later on. The
new preburner boost pump impeller end
balancer material was deemed inadequate. *
The replacement too had it’s problems, in this
case an inlet guide vane crack issue. This will
require inspections, not planned at all, after
every flight for this particular S/N unit only.
This is not to say the approach or basic
philosophy is flawed. Actually, the ATD will
likely enhance reusability (possibly saving up
to a weeks worth of work per SSME
turnaround). The basic approach is what will
likely be required in the future - only more so.
Consider the implications for a program such
as RLV. The ATD program has so far spent
$1.2 Billion on one turbopump. For the RLV,
10 flights is only the beginning. Not only will
components have to be reusable to degrees
not yet seen, they will have to take the
additional step that no inspections be required.
The R+D effort required for the realization of
this goal will likely require, even with much
* The impeller is balanced in a process that basically
removes material and then achieves balance by adding set
screws that are staked to preclude backing out or loosening.
These set screws were made of tantalum. The material is
dense so as to require few for balancing. Cracking (heads
cracked through on the screws) was discovered to be a
problem leading to loosening. The decision was made to
switch to a stainless steel. This will mean more maybe
required for balancing (a less dense material). Notably, the
particular pump passed inspection but, given the experience
on other units in work the decision was made to remove and
replace the pump.
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improved cost control and management
techniques, far more than the currently
foreseen finding for RLV. “Aircraft type
operations” will require true, extended
reusability built into a design as a result of
certification of the first type, rigorous
development of systems to a degree that
subsequent assemblies need not require the
same degree of test or scrutiny, and the
associated baggage - manpower and
infrastructure.
Aircraft Type Operations. the FAA and
Shuttle - a Comparison of Certifications of the
First Type
Government rules and regulations are imposed
on airplane manufacturers and operators to
guarantee the general public a certain level of
safety. This is done through the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). The origins
here trace back to 1926 and the Air
Commerce Act which authorized the first
significant federal regulation of civil aviation.
Duties given to the Secretary of Commerce
included fostering air commerce, establishing
airways, investigating accidents and certifying
aircraft. The new Aeronautics Branch that
was formed eventually led to the formation of
the FAA in 1958. By 1970 responsibilities
also included setting airport safety standards
and certificating those facilities as well.
It maybe argued that using aircraft type
analogies to space operations avoids obvious
differences such as the extremely demanding
operational environments of a launch or the
on-orbit and re-entry environment. However,
it is relevant here to consider approaches (not
results) used in the aircraft arena that reflect
on how to one day make launch systems that
do have “aircraft like operations”. Aircraft
designers and launch system designers must
each design for certain environments. The
question is not whether the environments are
similar but whether the approach used in one
situation to meet requirements is applicable to
the other. For an SSME, as an example, the
major contributor to life limitations is the
internal thermal environment. 11 It is
estimated 70°/0 of the problems encountered
on a high-pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP)
are thermally induced. Transients* * such as
the startup process represent the most severe
environment. The startup temperature
transient is especially a major element in
limiting turbine life. The thermal shock to the
turbine airfoils during preburner startup may
be imagined by visualizing a surface that wants
to expand but a core that is cool and only
catches up later. This thermal delta occurs
quickly but with enough of a difference to
cause thermal stresses and hence crack
propagation concerns. Again, aircraft do not
see such environments, but some approaches
used in the aircraft world to meet their
environments can shed light on how to
overcome launch system environments. If a
goal of any reusable launch vehicle is to have
operations like aircraft it is certainly relevant
to review how aircraft got where they are.
Advisory Circulars are used by the FM as
non mandatory guides to meeting actual
requirements or Federal Aviation Regulations
(FAR’s). Start-stop cyclic stresses or low
cycle fatigue (LCF) are addressed in the
8following:
“By a procedure approved by the
FAA operating limitations must be
established which specify the maximum
allowable number of start-stop stress
cycles for each rotor structural part
(such as discs, spacers, hubs, and
** The 1850R temperatures in this transient are addressed in
the new Pratt & Whitney ATD by the use of hollow airfoils.
Tactics such as decreasing operating temperatures (using
either fuel rich or oxidizer rich cycles) do not address this
start transient, LCF problem but do address high cycle
fatigue. Pressure transients also contribute to the LCF
problem. Notably, aircraft turbine engines operate up to
2160R uncooled. Current aircraft turbine inlet temperatures
are as high as 3260R and are being pushed toward 4600R,
the stochiometric limit of JP4 fuel. However, the ramp up to
these temperatures is slow compared to the SSME startup.
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shafts of the compressors and
turbines), the failure of which could
produce a hazard to the aircraft. A
start-stop stress cycle consists of a
flight cycle profile or an equivalent
representation of engine usage. It
includes starting the engine,
accelerating to maximum rated power
or thrust, decelerating, and stopping.
For each cycle the rotor structural
parts must reach stabilized temperature
during engine operation at a maximum
rate power or thrust and after engine
shutdown, unless it is shown that the
parts undergo the same stress range
without temperature stabilization”
For materials the suitability and
durability must “Be established on the
basis of experience or test”.
The actual number of cycles will be derived in
many cases from pre-approved procedures
already on file with the FAA for establishing
initial LCF lives. The most severe mission
cycle will be used in these determinations.
Tests that will form a part of the high-cycle
fatigue (HCF) profile for turbine aircraft
engines include 150 hour endurance tests
accumulated by running 6-hour test sequences
25 times. If major repairs or the frequency of
service is excessive during these tests then the
engine will be subjected to further tests. Other
tests will include vibration, calibration,
detonation and operation tests. In conducting
these 6block tests separate engines of identical
design and construction may be used for each
of the various tests.
A current example here is the certification of
the Pratt & Whitney PW4084 powerplant for
the new Boeing 777. Tests included 3000
simulated (off aircraft) flight cycles with no
major component failures and the ability to
demonstrate maximum continuous thrust for 3
hours in repeated testing. Flight tests will
further include another 1000 cycles. Again,
the emphasis is “no major component failures”
so as to demonstrate high life limits for both
low and high cycle fatigue. Unique to the
PW4084 case is the goal of demonstrating
extended twin operations (ETOPS) or that is
the ability to maintain the performance
necessary for single engine flight. The focus
here is to develop and demonstrate from the
start the suitability for a particular type of
operation such as ETOPS rather than to
operations which are less demanding but more
constrained. Another alternative would have
been to initially certify to a less demanding
operation and then allow the evolving flight
experience to extend the operations envelope.
This could also have also resulted in ETOPS
certification eventually. By certifying for
ETOPS, customer requirements for flexibility
(usable on many routes) and reduced
operations costs (twin jets versus aircraft
using more engines to allow ETOPS) are
enabled from day one of delivery.
Maintaining certification once it is achieved
will be done through maintenance according
to certification maintenance requirements
(CMR’s). CMR’s should not be confused with
maintenance requirements arising from
certification nor with other scheduled
maintenance requirements. For a Boeing 767
the 3“CMR tasks are identified whenever
system probabilities and failure effects are not
expected to fall within an acceptable range
without a periodic maintenance requirement”.
CMR’s or any changes to CMR’s are approved
exclusively by FAA engineering. For a 767
most of the CMR frequencies are in the range
of thousands of hours of flight time. Prior to
these times other requirements that may have
been scheduled may have covered the items.
These frequencies also list in the thousands of
cycles and hours of usage.
For comparison, a review of a high pressure
fuel turbopump (HPFTP) on a Shuttle SSME
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will show a life* usage of 8 starts and 2767
seconds. This does not represent usage since
the last check. It does not include repair and
refurbishment. Major work may have been
performed on the assembly during this time.
Failures may also have occurred. The usage
numbers are only useful to a next order
assembly such as the housing 12. Fleet leader
numbers may be 69 starts and 25861 seconds
for a HPFTP. Again, the same caveats apply.
Work on the Rocketdyne Shuttle HPOTP’s is
done after every flight. Removal from the
engine is driven by recurring problems with a
tip seal retainer. This retainer uses set screws,
staked in place, to hold it in. The backing out
of these screws and a history of machining
tolerance problems on the tip seal itself drives
the removal every flight on the HPOTP’s.
Unlike other work which is also required
every flight, this particular item, an inspection,
can not be done with the pumps installed on
the engines. Following the fulfillment of
requirements such as these, a particular serial
number set of pumps maybe certified for a
particular Shuttle flight. However, these will
have limited relevance to other pumps and
other certification processes. It is the fleet
leaders that will bear greatest relevance in
certifying not only individual similar items but
also the design in general. Again, however,
short fleet leader lives will in turn create short
actual lives for components to be used.
systems. The rigorous testing used for the
design and subsequent certfication of aircraft
systems for high life limits and usage results
in designs capable of extended reuse with no
major failures between uses. This reflects on
what will be required to design and certify a
reusable launch vehicle for extended reuse
with no major failures between uses.
Interestingly, before the FAA was formed, the
certification of airline pilots and airplanes was
done by Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
which is today the world’s largest independent
certifier of product safety. While safety and
reliability or reusability issues do not always
overlap, they have in common a need for
systems to demonstrate the ability to operate
as planned under the most severe operating
and environmental conditions. UL is well
known for testing products by turning them on
and off hundreds of thousands, perhaps
millions, of times or perhaps turning them on
and leaving them that way for ridiculously
extended time periods. Design and
destruction leads to the familiar UL symbol on
multitudes of products which are safe and
certified. It maybe said they are “free of
range constraints”.
Final Summary - What Will be Required for
RLV Certification
The RLV technology program goals are
This is not to say that life limits comparable to extremely ambitious. The basic goal is to
the aircraft analogy apply to the case of the demonstrate technologies leading to a reusable
launch system. The need and ability for launch vehicle that will be affordable and
loitering capability in aircraft has as yet no
equal in a comparison to a launch vehicle
during ascent. The relevance is to
methodology used in one case such as aircraft
as a reflection on the testing for certifcation
of candidate reusable launch vehicles and
* The actual usefulness of tracking regardless of the degree
of repair and refurbishment is as an indication of life limits
for some internal components which are used over and over
with only inspections. A sheet metal problem can, for
example, be better understood by comparing a unit set to fly
against higher life units.
provide routine access to space. Low cost
and high availability will only be combined
through a reduction on single vehicle
turnaround times.
True certification is development of systems to
a degree that subsequent assemblies can be
manufactured and operated without having to
undergo the same degree of test or scrutiny.
Having reviewed aircraft methodologies it can
be shown that the rigorous testing used for the
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design and subsequent certification of aircraft
systems for high life limits and usage results in
designs capable of extended reuse with no
major failures between uses. This approach is
one key to reducing turnaround times and
achieving RLV goals.
For a reusable launch system to one day sever
it’s ties to a range, and transition to a truly
operational site, or no longer require explosive
charges, the reliability of the system will first
have to be demonstrated. Rigorous
certification processes for components and
subsystems will increase reliability and the
likelihood of demonstrating no need for a
range. A key to establishing a high
demonstrated reliability for the whole launch
system, however, will be to also reduce
fictional complexity of the launch system.
Reducing functional complexity means both
“fewer” and for what’s left, “more integrated. ”
A reduction in functional complexity will also
reduce criticality complexity.
Complexity driving one way, toward greater
mission reliability, but opposingly, toward
less support reliability, ceases to be true. A
reusable launch system focused on simplicity
has the greatest likelihood of achieving the
combination of demonstrating high mission
reliability aimed toward freeing itself from
the “range” as well as doing so affordably.
An advanced, health management system
(HMS) focused on ground turnaround will be
required for any RLV aimed at one time only
certification and the twin goals of affordability
and high availability. This additional system
should be evolved from turnaround
operational concerns versus current systems
focused on ascent or on orbit operations only.
An HMS will be a necessary complement to
rigorous certification processes at all system
levels, reductions in complexity, and
demonstration of reliability. This is key to
true certification, development of systems to a
degree that subsequent assemblies can be
manufactured and operated without having to
undergo the same degree of test or scrutiny.
In closing, although this paper is not intended
to address issues of cost in relation to
certification, it is highly probable that the
foreseen finding for reusable launch system
technologies is inadequate assuming a
certification approach as previously reviewed
which is consistent with achieving the long
term goals of affordable and highly available
transportation to space. The term “quantum
leap” is often used in the program to refer to
what is technologically required to
dramatically reduce the cost of space
transportation. This would seem to imply that
whereas once there was continuity of
development all of a sudden there will be a
discontinuity, a new state with no traceable
connection between it and what came before.
This is unlikely. This is not to say affordable
and highly available space transportation can
not be achieved. However, rigorous
certification at all system levels, reductions in
complexity, demonstrated reliability and
advanced health management systems will be
required. This will involve an appreciable
investment in the future. This will create the
path connecting where we are to where we
want to go.
Internet Note
Due to space limitations it is not possible here
to give due credit to the subject at hand. A
more extensive and complete version of this
paper is available via the Internet under the
same subject name at the following website
address:
http://calvin.ksc.nasa.gov:lO8O/nexgen/rlvhp.htm
References
1. Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and
Development, AGARD, Smart Structures for Aircraft
3-43
and Spacecraft, AGARD Conference Proceedings 531
Lindau, Germany, October 1992.
2. Aerospace Engineering, Condition Monitoring and
Diagnostics, SAE International, January/February
1995.
3. Boeing Company, Boeing 767 Maintenance
Planning Data Volume 2
4. Boiler, Chr. and Dilger, R., In-Flight Aircraft
Structure Health Monitoring Based on Smart
Structures Technology, AGARD Conference
Proceedings 531, Section 17, October 1992.
5. Department of Defense, Logistics Support Analysis.
MIL-STD-1388-lA , 11 April, 1983
6. Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Dept. of
Transportation, Aircraft Engine Type Certification
Handbook, Advisory Circular AC 33-2B , June 30,
1994.
7. Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Dept. of
Transportation, Certification Procedures for Products
and Parts, Special Federal Aviation Regulations,
Subchapter C - Aircraft, Part 21.
8. Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Dept. of
Transportation, Airworthiness Standards: Aircraft
Engines, Special Federation Aviation Regulations,
Subchapter C - Aircraft, Part 33.
9. Feynman, R. P., “Personal Observations on the
Reliability of the Shuttle,” Report by the Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident, Appendix F, 1986.
10. GelI-Mann, Murray., The Quark and the Jaguar.
Adventures in the Simple and the Complex, Princeton
University Press, 1994.
11. Goracke, B. David, Levack, Daniel J. H., Margin
Considerations in SSTO 02/H2 Engines, AIAA 94-
4676, AIAA Space Programs and Technologies
Conference and Exhibit, September 27-29, 1994.
12. National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Endeavour. STS-68 Delta SSME Project, SSME Flight
Readiness Review, 21 September 1994.
13. National Aeronautics and Space Administration /
Industry Operations Synergy Team, Operations
Concept Vision and Operability Criteria Document,
November 1994.
14. National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Marshall Space Flight Center, RLV Concept Study
Team Review, October 1994.
15. National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Johnson Space Center, Space Shuttle Requirements
and Procedures for Certification of Flight Readiness
(NSTS 08117), February 21, 1995.
16. National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
SSME Accident/ Incident Report SSC Test 904-044,
Rockwell International, 23 June 1994.
17. National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Subsystem Certification Plan, Main Propulsion,
Rockwell International, November 1977.
18. Rockwell International Corporation, Rocketdyne
Division, SSME Component Allowable Life and
Hardware Tracking Program Requirements,
Specification - RLO0532, Rockwell International,
February 1994.
19. SAE International RMS Committee (G-11),
Reliability, Maintainability. and Supportability
Guidebook. 2nd Edition, Society of Automotive
Engineers, Inc., 1992.
20. Schmidt, W. and Boiler, Chr.,Smart Structures, A
Technology For Next Generation Aircraft, AGARD
Conference Proceedings 531, Section 1, October 1992.
21. Smiljanic, Ray R., Definitions, Models and
Methods for Supportability Analyses, McDonnell
Douglas Aerospace (MDA), 28 June 1994.
22. U.S. Statistical Abstract, U.S. Major and National
Airline Costs, Air Transport Association of America,
1993.
Acknowledgments
Dave Spacek, NASA KSC, on the subject of Space
Shuttle Main Engine Alternate Turbopump
Development.
D.R. Komar, NASA KSC, on the subject of KSC
Space Shuttle Main Engine verification and processing
for flight.
3-44
